Writer: Erica Chenoweth
A common misconception is that nonviolent resistance is only possible in a few situations:
1- When the opposite party is too weak or unable to prevent or defeat the movement,
2- When the campaign makes relatively clear demands for reforms,
3- When the campaign proposes a free and open political system.
But this notion is wrong. Civil resistance campaigns against both weak and strong opponents have been effective. Civil resistance campaigns have been successful in achieving reformist and radical demands, and have done so even in very closed political environments where open demonstrations of opposition have been nearly impossible.
In fact, the effectiveness of a non-violent revolution depends more on its political power than on its moral correctness. When we look at the history of such movements, four key factors emerge in explaining their success or failure.
1- Wide participation from all walks of life
The most important factor affecting the success of civil resistance campaigns is the scale and scope of their popular participation. The larger and more diverse the campaign’s participant base, the more likely it is to succeed. Mass participation would seriously disrupt the status quo and make continued repression impossible. It causes the supporters of the system (especially most of the security forces) to escape from the institutions; And it limits the options of the power holder. A large-scale campaign is politically impossible to ignore. It is difficult for even the most ruthless opposition to suppress large numbers of peaceful people who work together to refuse to cooperate with the regime and disrupt daily life. Especially when the campaign has different methods and approaches.
People who participate in civil resistance campaigns can be from any class. In fact, the inclusive nature of civil resistance is the main reason for the success of non-violent measures. Nonviolent action is a method of dealing with injustice that does not require intense physical training, long journeys away from home and family, or an unconditional willingness to use violence against opponents.
Thus, nonviolence campaigns are more likely to include women, minorities, children, the elderly, people with disabilities, people with a moral commitment to nonviolence, parents of young children, marginalized groups, and others who would not necessarily volunteer for armed struggle. As a result, nonviolent movements are likely to attract more people than armed struggles.
How a movement can attract masses of people from all walks of life involves what sociologist Douglas McAdam calls “cognitive freedom.” A process in which a large number of people collectively come to the conclusion that a great injustice has occurred and that they must take action to change the situation and confront it. The collective reason for making change is that they can no longer go back to a time when they were unaware of injustice or were willing to tolerate it rather than risk it.
2- Changing the loyalty of regime supporters
Civil resistance works by mobilizing enough power from below so that grassroots civil society can seriously disrupt the work of those responsible for implementing and enforcing the programs and policies of those in power. This leads us to the second key factor: the ability of a movement to shift the allegiance of people in enemy support columns.
The wider the range of support groups, the more likely the movement will represent a fuller spectrum of society with diverse spheres of influence, which means more ways to reach people in the opposition’s support columns.
It is very important not to underestimate the social power that can dramatically affect the status quo. Even people who feel they have no ability to influence the political system have social power. Everyone has at least some relationships through which they can challenge or influence the behavior of others. Social approval and disapproval have a powerful effect on human behavior. The desire to maintain approval or easy relationships with family members, friends, peers, and neighbors can convince even those in a regime that they can no longer support the system. People at every level influence the social environment and the attitude of some key part of the regime, whether they are foot soldiers on the front lines or generals who design strategy or civil servants such as diplomats or those who work in the electricity distribution system.
Movements that succeed in attracting key regime figures and loyalists are more likely to succeed than movements that do not. Changing these loyalties does not require pitying the hearts of opponents or appealing to morality, but often means hurting the wallets of key economic or business elites, threatening the commercial or professional interests of key military or security officials, or simply marginalizing powerful opponents at home. Regime by reformist elites who are beginning to understand the shift in collective political positions.
However, each campaign has its own characteristics. For example, in highly racist or ethnically divided societies, it may be impossible to convince security forces—who usually represent a privileged ethnic or racial group. Also, many regimes seek to keep themselves away from the risk of desertion by the police, army and others by hiring foreigners or mercenaries to provide security. Yet the loyalty of other key groups, such as economic and business elites, can often be undermined if people’s power imposes sufficient costs on them.
It also seems that the most common reason for the failure of movements is that the movements fail to defeat key pro-system groups and force change. This is usually because the regime’s supporters never lose faith in its ability to endure, or cannot imagine the prosperity of the society the movement is trying to create. Also, supporters of a regime may remain loyal to it because powerful international allies have supported the regime.
3- Using a wide range of tactics
Movements that use a variety of tactics are more likely to succeed than movements that rely too heavily on one method, such as protests or demonstrations. Nonviolent campaigns that use their vast human capital to develop new and unpredictable tactics do better at sustaining momentum than movements that are predictable and tactically stagnant. In general, it seems that among different tactics, economic non-cooperation works very effectively because it imposes immediate and direct costs on the regime.
4- Discipline and resistance to repression
Movements succeed when they develop standing power. It means fostering resilience, maintaining order, and sustaining collective participation even when the state violently represses them. The most important thing is that the movement can remain organized in any situation, apart from the actions of the regime. Movements that succeed in achieving this goal usually have a clear organizational structure. They have plans to replace a successor if the leader is imprisoned, killed or removed, and contingency plans for how to respond when repression escalates. These plans also involve keeping a wide range of people involved, in large numbers, even under fire, because suppressing a very diverse movement is likely to backfire on the regime. It is more difficult (though not impossible) for regimes to deal with targeting civilians who are considered mainstream or even close to the regime’s social circles than smaller-scale populations that are not perceived as representative of society as a whole. target Moreover, police and military forces are rarely called upon to use violence against individuals, which may include their children and cousins, accountants, priests or imams. Because of the potential for repression to backfire, nonviolent campaigns can be far more successful than violent ones, even when the regime actively attacks and kills nonviolent participants. In fact, from 1900 to 2019, maximum nonviolence campaigns that faced violent repression were successful 45 percent of the time, while violent campaigns were successful only 22 percent of the time.
Each of these four factors—large-scale participation, shifting loyalties, tactical innovation, and resilience to repression—are more easily managed when a movement is well organized and prepared for a long struggle. Never be fooled by how quickly many regimes collapse when faced with a mass non-violent revolution. Organized and organized campaigns often follow months or years of planning and organizing that precede mass mobilization.
The formation grounds of successful civil resistance campaigns
Successful nonviolence campaigns are rarely spontaneous. They require time, effort and planning. In fact, on average, a successful nonviolent mass mobilization takes sixteen months, not including the phases in which movements are planning, training, and strategizing before mass action begins. But this is significantly shorter than the average successful campaign of violence, which lasts more than five years.
For civil resistance to succeed, campaigns must be broad, innovative and sustained, and demonstrate to regime-supporting communities that political biases have irreversibly changed and that switching factions is in their long-term interest. Size, unity, creative tactical innovation, and leverage through separation are what make nonviolent resistance campaigns successful.
It is also not true that non-violent resistance is effective only in democratic societies, in developed countries or in more liberal cultures, because historically civil resistance has been formed as an approach in completely non-democratic contexts. Although individual protests may be more common in democracies that support the right to peaceful assembly, protests are not the same as movements, and mass movements are no more effective in democracies than in autocracies. First, because in democracies, people already have a political pressure window called elections, which gives them an opportunity to put pressure on the government and its policies. Whereas in authoritarian regimes, where elections are absent or rigged, mass mobilization is often the only way people can voice their opposition.
Second, movements often grow under authoritarian regimes when those regimes have slowly lost their legitimacy over time. The longer a dictator lasts, the easier it is for citizens to identify with that dictator (or dictatorial system). And they collectively agree that he should. In democracies, however, movements tend to focus less on individuals and more on the policies and systems they seek to change. However, these movements have difficulty agreeing on which reforms are most necessary among the economic, social, and political policies being discussed. As a result, democracies often have different interest groups that often compete with each other.
Nor does there seem to be any particular culture in which civil resistance is more likely. Nor does civil resistance grow exclusively from Western liberal values or “Judeo-Christian” beliefs. All major world religions contain texts and practices that provide sufficient justification for civil resistance, as well as examples of religious followers who have used it.
Also, many movements seek to repeat the successes of neighboring countries. But when activists in one country—no matter how ethnically or religiously close they are to neighboring countries—think they can replicate their neighbors’ efforts, they often fail. Because the dictatorial governments also prepare themselves by learning from the movements in the same countries.
Also, international support for separatist and anti-colonial movements – especially diplomatic recognition – is often crucial. Without universal recognition of a government, secession campaigns have not practically won.
Is there a formula for effective civil resistance campaigns?
There is probably no universal formula. Every country, every citizen, every anger is unique. However, significant patterns can be found that appear to be consistent across successful campaigns.
One of the important models is to create the critical mass needed to change national governments. No movement has ever failed after 10 percent of the country’s population actively participated in its culminating event. Most movements succeed after mobilizing 3.5%.
According to the “3.5 percent rule,” no revolution has failed when 3.5 percent of the population has actively participated in a visible culminating event such as a battle, mass demonstration, or other form of noncooperation. Getting 3.5% of the population to act on a cause almost certainly tells you that the majority of people support that cause. The entry of such a significant minority into the streets is probably the result, not the cause, of the movement’s popular support. However, this rule is derived from past investigations and is not a practical guarantee for future movements.
Organization of successful civil resistance
There is still no general consensus on how to organize effective civil resistance. Some successful civil resistance movements have had acceptable leadership that has helped the movement overcome major challenges. These leaders define the collective vision, share expectations and enforce movement norms, coordinate public relations, make strategic decisions, and negotiate and bargain on behalf of the movement.
Tactically, if a movement does not have a clear leader, governments have a harder time eliminating the leader of the movement through arrest or overthrowing it through infiltration. Ideologically, leaderless movements can really appeal to people struggling against oppressive structures, hierarchies, and corruption.
But the leaderless approach to resistance carries some major long-term strategic commitments, especially if movements don’t find a way to create and maintain an organizational form that can coordinate many groups and demands for effective action. First, if tasks such as negotiation, public relations, coalition building, or strategy are not divided among specific individuals, movements cannot negotiate with opponents who may be willing to make concessions.
Second, leaderless movements have a harder time managing public relations crises.
Third, leaderless movements have difficulty establishing working relationships with other institutions, which is essential if the movement is to expand its supporters and eliminate opposition.
Fourth, movements typically need methods for evaluating strategic decisions, changing course, and moving in new directions. Leaderless movements may improvise in the short term, but without some agreed-upon central authority with the power to change tactics and communicate new plans, movements will struggle to maintain the discipline, consistency, and coordination necessary to succeed.
Although leaderless resistance may be ideologically attractive to those who distrust authority, it carries serious strategic disadvantages for any civil resistance effort. This is not to say that all campaigns require strict hierarchies or single leaders at the top. But they will need some kind of leadership, coordination and organization to be effective.
Today’s movements have moved away from individualistic leadership models and have instead adopted a federal and coalition structure that prioritizes active coordination with and accountability to front-line organizers and activists. It also seems that the consensus is that if A movement wants to attract a wide range of people, it is better not to rely too much on one personality.
According to the “3.5 percent rule,” no revolution has failed when 3.5 percent of the population has actively participated in a visible culminating event such as a battle, mass demonstration, or other form of noncooperation. Getting 3.5% of the population to act on a cause almost certainly tells you that the majority of people support that cause. The entry of such a significant minority into the streets is probably the result, not the cause, of the movement’s popular support. However, this rule is derived from past investigations and is not a practical guarantee for future movements.
Organization of successful civil resistance
There is still no general consensus on how to organize effective civil resistance. Some successful civil resistance movements have had acceptable leadership that has helped the movement overcome major challenges. These leaders define the collective vision, share expectations and enforce movement norms, coordinate public relations, make strategic decisions, and negotiate and bargain on behalf of the movement.
Tactically, if a movement does not have a clear leader, governments have a harder time eliminating the leader of the movement through arrest or overthrowing it through infiltration. Ideologically, leaderless movements can really appeal to people struggling against oppressive structures, hierarchies, and corruption.
But the leaderless approach to resistance carries some major long-term strategic commitments, especially if movements don’t find a way to create and maintain an organizational form that can coordinate many groups and demands for effective action. First, if tasks such as negotiation, public relations, coalition building, or strategy are not divided among specific individuals, movements cannot negotiate with opponents who may be willing to make concessions.
Second, leaderless movements have a harder time managing public relations crises.
Third, leaderless movements have difficulty establishing working relationships with other institutions, which is essential if the movement is to expand its supporters and eliminate opposition.
Fourth, movements typically need methods for evaluating strategic decisions, changing course, and moving in new directions. Leaderless movements may improvise in the short term, but without some agreed-upon central authority with the power to change tactics and communicate new plans, movements will struggle to maintain the discipline, consistency, and coordination necessary to succeed.
Although leaderless resistance may be ideologically attractive to those who distrust authority, it carries serious strategic disadvantages for any civil resistance effort. This is not to say that all campaigns require strict hierarchies or single leaders at the top. But they will need some kind of leadership, coordination and organization to be effective.
Today’s movements have moved away from individualistic leadership models and have instead adopted a federal and coalition structure that prioritizes active coordination with and accountability to front-line organizers and activists. It also seems that the consensus is that if A movement wants to attract a wide range of people, it is better not to rely too much on one personality.
